This paper formulates a model in which a …rm simultaneously chooses its organizational structure and product position. The …rm's production is knowledge-intensive, requiring employees to solve problems. A vertical hierarchy in which workers refer unsolved problems to managers facilitates the acquisition and leveraging of managers'superior knowledge. I show that a larger span of control is complementary to the provision of high-value products. Moreover, this complementarity is sustained when employees acquire su¢ cient knowledge and is further strengthened when the …rm enhances its capability of communicating knowledge. The model yields testable implications concerning: (1) the …t between a …rm's product position and span of control; 2) the e¤ect of information technology on product innovations and skill-biased organizational changes; and 3) the heterogeneity in hierarchical structure and human resource management in professional service …rms.
testable hypotheses about how the …t between product positioning and the span of control a¤ects …rm performance and how this …t responds to changes in a …rm's ability to acquire and integrate knowledge.
I start from a problem-solving approach, in which individual workers acquire knowledge, such as expertise and know-how, to solve problems that deliver value to the …rm. Superior knowledge is more valuable, but is more costly to acquire. After it has been acquired, knowledge can be used concurrently by many individuals, without diminishing its availability to any of the users. As Garicano (2000) shows, to minimize the cost of knowledge acquisition and increase the intensive use of superior knowledge, a knowledge-based hierarchy emerges: production workers acquire knowledge about the most common or easiest problems confronted and pass the more exceptional or harder problems to problem solvers who acquire more advanced knowledge and specialize in helping their subordinates. Such a model articulates Demsetz's (1988) observation that e¢ cient knowledge acquisition entails specialization and that the e¢ cient application of knowledge requires the integration of specialized knowledge.
Based on this problem-solving approach, I model the decisions of a …rm, which is endowed with the technologies of acquiring and integrating knowledge, with respect to three choices: 1) the vertical position of a product that correlates its market value positively with the complexity of problems in production; 2) the hierarchical structure that speci…es the extent of knowledge leverage measured by the span of control, i.e., the subordinates-to-supervisor ratio; and 3) the levels of knowledge acquired by all workers. The essential insight of the model is that the alignment between product position and hierarchical structure resolves the con ‡ict between value creation through selecting superior products, on the one hand, and production e¢ ciency through leveraging knowledge, on the other hand. For instance, a high-end product creates more unit-value for a …rm, but workers have a high probability to encounter unknown problems and must frequently interact with managers. For a manager with time constraints, frequent interactions with one worker imply fewer interactions with other workers. Thus, the scope of knowledge integration is reduced and the extent of leveraging superior knowledge is limited. Conversely, a low-end product generates less market value but allows a …rm to easily sustain a high level of knowledge leverage and to achieve production e¢ ciency. To simultaneously attain a high-end product position and a high level of knowledge leverage, a …rm must acquire substantial knowledge for its employees and maintain a balanced distribution of knowledge across hierarchical layers.
The model establishes a mechanism that ties together a …rm's knowledge input, organizational structure, and product selection to achieve superior performance. A …rm's ability to acquire knowledge and its e¢ ciency in integrating knowledge are two key drivers. I view a …rm's ability to acquire knowledge as a capability that enables workers to overcome their cognitive limitations during the process of problem-solving. Thus, better training and mentoring of workers, the adoption of advanced information-extraction technology, and the use of new learning methods all improve a …rm's ability to acquire knowledge. I show that such improvements increase a …rm's pro…tability by simultaneously expanding its span of control and upgrading its product as the consequence of an even increase in the knowledge level of all workers. A …rm's ability to integrate knowledge depends on the codi…ability of knowledge, which distinguishes whether knowledge is explicit or tacit and governs the cost to communicate knowledge. The model predicts that …rms that primarily use coded knowledge in production, such as engineering and accounting …rms, tend to employ a hierarchy with a large span of control, matched to an unbalanced distribution of knowledge across layers, whereas …rms whose production relies more on tacit knowledge, such as consulting and law …rms, tend to employ a hierarchy with a narrow span of control, matched to a balanced distribution of knowledge across layers. Furthermore, I show that improvements in communicating knowledge -either coded or tacit -lead a …rm to expand its span of control, but may induce it to upgrade or downgrade its product, depending on whether knowledge in the production of a superior product becomes more or less codi…able. I apply these results to study the e¤ects of advances in information and communication technology on skill-biased organizational change and product innovation.
"The fundamentals of the professional service business are brutally simple; it's about talent, it's about clients, and it's about teaming to bring it all together to create and deliver value," claims Jim Quigley, the former CEO of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited (Broaderick 2011, p.9). Our theoretical model captures the three key elements of Quigley's claim: 1) talent -the knowledge that is embodied in human minds; 2) product positioning, as determined by clients'valuation; and 3) organizational structure that brings the …rst two elements together. To illustrate the intuition and business relevance of the model, I draw extensively on observations from PSFs, which themselves comprise an increasingly important economic sector. 2 However, the basic insights of this paper apply to a wide range of other activities, as will be discussed in the conclusion.
Related Literature
This paper stands at the intersection of organizational economics and strategy research.
Despite the burgeoning interest in the economic study of organizational design, organizational economists have not yet paid much explicit attention to strategy, as noted by Argyres et al.
(2012) and Roberts and Saloner (2013) . Several papers (e.g., Roberts 1990, 1995) model the complementarities among elements of strategy and organization. However, they focus on the …t of a variety of managerial instruments inside …rms, taking product choice as given. This paper builds on a strand of modern organizational economics literature in which organizational structure is modeled as a coordination system to acquire, gather, and process dispersed information (e.g., Radner 1993; Bolton and Dewatripont 1994; Van Zandt 1998; Garicano 2000), but it departs from this literature by explicitly introducing product choice. The introduction of this new element shifts the focus from the resource-allocation role of organizational structure to the strategic role of organizational structure as a mediator between available resources and product choice. In this respect, our paper bridges a gap between organizational economics and strategy research.
Conceptually, this paper is closely related to the knowledge-based theory of the …rm.
The economics foundation of our hierarchy model can be traced back to Hayek's (1945) fundamental idea that organizations exist, to a large extent, to integrate knowledge that is dispersedly distributed among di¤erent individuals. Elaborating on this idea, numerous studies in strategy research have developed various theories of the …rm as an institution for integrating knowledge. 3 Among these studies, Grant (1996a, b) are particularly similar to our paper in the emphasis on the coordination mechanisms through which knowledge is integrated to create capabilities. Complementary to his verbal arguments, I employ a formal model to articulate the premises (assumptions), the drivers (exogenous variables), and the e¤ects (endogenous variables). Such a formalization not only clari…es some implications in the existing literature and brings them closer to empirical research, but also generates several new insights regarding the interplay between knowledge acquisition and knowledge integration and regarding the formation of a …rm's knowledge-based capabilities.
The behavior foundation of this paper is rooted in Simon's (1947 Simon's ( , 1991 theory of "bounded rationality,"in which agents are subject to cognitive limitations in learning, decision-making, and communication. This "bounded rationality"view provides a common cornerstone for various studies of knowledge-based production. 4 Our problem-solving approach is conceptually close to Nickerson and Zenger (2004) , which theorizes about the di¤erentiation of organizational alternatives based on their e¢ ciency in resolving con ‡icts during the search for solutions to problems. Their research emphasizes the cognitive process of acquiring knowledge and the e¤ects of this process on a …rm's boundaries, whereas our research emphasizes the economic e¢ ciency of acquiring and integrating knowledge and its e¤ects on …rms'internal structure and the …t between strategy and structure. Although our economics approach di¤ers substantially from those used in organization science, our analysis of the knowledge-integration mechanism bears some similarity to some recent studies of epistemic interdependence between agents and the resulting information processing within organizations (e.g., Puranam et al. 2012 ).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I present a simple example to sketch the basic idea of the paper. In section 3, I present the formal model. In Section 4, I perform comparative statics analysis of the model to derive a number of testable empirical hypotheses. Section 5 discusses several extensions. Section 6 concludes. Proofs of lemmas and propositions are presented in the appendix. 3 See Foss (2006) for an extensive survey of the literature on the knowledge-based view of organizations. 4 See Garicano and Prat (2013) and Garicano and Wu (2012) for extensive discussions of this body of work and its implications for strategy research.
In this section, I construct a simple example to outline the basic idea of this paper. A …rm is modeled as a team of 1 + s agents: one manager and s workers. This two-layer team aims to solve problems that lead to the production of a good. For example, in a …rm that provides engineering services, a senior engineer supervises junior engineers to solve customers' problems; in a consulting or law …rm, a partner supervises associates to provide the services demanded by customers.
Production. Problem-solving is the basic activity of knowledge-intensive production. Solving problems requires knowledge speci…c to problems, such as expertise and know-how.
To capture the uncertainty of applying knowledge to problem-solving, I assume that an agent, with a set of acquired knowledge A, can successfully solve a problem with probability F (A). For simplicity, I take an agent's knowledge set as exogenously given. 5 Consider two agents endowed with knowledge sets A 1 and A 2 , respectively. As long as A 1 and A 2 are not identical, the knowledge set of a single agent is a subset of the knowledge sets of the two agents. This speci…cation includes two important situations in which: 1) one agent's knowledge encompasses the other's knowledge; and 2) one agent's knowledge supplements the other's knowledge. The …rst situation describes a master-apprentice relationship, such as the partner-associate relationship in law …rms and consulting …rms; the second situation describes a relationship between two specialists, in which one agent specializes in advanced knowledge and the other specializes in elementary knowledge, such as engineers in engineering service …rms and doctors in healthcare …rms. In either situation, I label the agent with superior knowledge -the one with either broader or more-advanced knowledge -as a manager (she) and the other as a worker (he). I denote the knowledge set acquired by the manager A m and the one acquired by a worker A w . Reasonably,
Organization. In the above production process, one way of organizing production is that the manager specializes in helping workers who fail to solve a problem. Through this way, the manager's knowledge, once acquired, can be used multiple times in combination with workers'knowledge. This is precisely the notion of knowledge leverage in the management of PSFs. However, the extent of knowledge leverage is constrained by the cost of communication in referring unsolved problems because e¤ective communication takes time an extremely scarce resource. Without loss of generality, I assume that the communication cost, denoted as h 2 (0; 1), is all borne by the manager in terms of her time. The manager, who supervises s workers, faces the following constraint: [1 F (A w )]sh 1; where 1 F (A w ) is the probability that a problem is beyond a worker's knowledge set and thus referred to the manager. The right-hand side of the inequality is the manager's available work time normalized to one, which is the upper limit that a manager can use to help her s workers. In this two-layer hierarchy, the organizational structure of the …rm is fully characterized by s, which I refer to as the span of control or the extent of knowledge leverage.
Product. In addition to the choice of the span of control s, the …rm can choose the complexity of problems, indexed with a scalar k. A problem is more complex when it is less decomposable and requires more knowledge to solve it (e.g., Simon 1962; Kau¤man 1993).
Consequently, for an agent with a constant knowledge level, the probability of solving a more-complex problem is lower: F (A; k 0 ) < F (A; k) if k 0 > k. However, solving problems that are more complex can create more value for customers and permit charging a higher price: (k 0 ) > (k) if k 0 > k. I thus call a product indexed with a larger k as a superior product.
In sum, endowed with the knowledge sets (A m ; A w ) and a communication cost h, a …rm aims to maximize its output:
In this objective function, the manager can spend fraction of her time solving problems by herself and 1 fraction of her time helping workers. Since
and s > 1, it is optimal for the manager to fully specialize in helping workers, that is, = 0. 
Suppose that a …rm currently o¤ering product k considers moving to a superior product position k 0 so as to reap a higher pro…t margin: (k 0 ) > (k). This adjustment, however, would incur two costs. First, because a superior product requires solving problems that are more complex, the …rm's production is less e¤ective:
. This is the production cost. Second, workers encountering problems that are more complex must ask the manager for help more frequently, which reduces the span of control and consequently restricts the intensive use of the manager's knowledge. This is the organizational cost. Only when the superior product's market value exceeds the production and organizational costs can a …rm pro…t from choosing it. Even when production cost is low due to a highly talented manager, a high organizational cost can limit the leverage of the manager's knowledge and thus constrain the …rm's product choice.
An important result arises from the above analysis: the match between a …rm's product choice and organizational structure depends on the distribution of knowledge across hierarchical layers. This can be seen from the term (2), which indicates the probability of a problem being solved by the manager conditional on it being unsolved by a worker. For a team composed of a competent manager but less-able workers, F (A m [ A w ; k) is large, implying that the probability for the …rm to solve complex problems is high; however, 1 F (A w ; k)
is large as well, implying that the less-able workers will frequently request help. Thus, it is di¢ cult to leverage the manager's knowledge, and a …rm optimally chooses a superior product and a narrow span of control. Such a strategy focuses on a high pro…t margin, forgoing production e¢ ciency per unit. Conversely, with a team composed of an incompetent manager but able workers, a …rm can easily leverage the manager's knowledge, although the probability for the …rm to solve complex problems is low. Consequently, the …rm prefers the combination of a low-end product and a wide span of control; its strategy focuses on production e¢ ciency -the low average cost due to more intensive use of knowledge, forgoing a high pro…t margin. Only when both the manager and the workers are competent can a …rm match a superior product with a wide span of control and realize the dual bene…ts of a high pro…t margin and the intensive use of the manager's knowledge.
The above example illustrates the essential idea of this paper: organizational structure mediates between available resources and product choice. In the example, however, available resources -the agents'knowledge -are exogenously provided, and the division of labor among agents is prescribed. An analysis of knowledge-intensive organizations is incomplete without understanding how knowledge is acquired and how labor is divided among workers. A more sophisticated model is required to track these variables together with a …rm's product choice and organizational structure.
The Model
In this section, I introduce a general approach to represent the problem-solving process and elaborate on the basic concepts mentioned in the previous section. The model preserves the basic features of the example in Section 2: knowledge is the main input in production and problem-solving is the primary productive activity. However, the model di¤ers from the example in that agents must acquire knowledge to solve problems. This new feature gives rise to a fundamental trade-o¤ between the cost of acquiring knowledge and the bene…t of using knowledge intensively, which in turn determines the division of labor among agents and thus the e¢ cient allocation of resources inside …rms.
Setup

Production
As in Section 2, production requires a worker to use knowledge to solve problems. I restrict attention to knowledge that is 1) used to solve speci…c problems; and 2) embodied in the human mind. This restrictive de…nition of knowledge di¤erentiates our study from the vast economic studies of information and technology. In our study, knowledge is above all a cognitive capability. Its acquisition requires the mobilization of scarce cognitive resources, and its integration is subject to cognitive limitations. I see this "bounded rationality" view of knowledge-based production as applicable to general production processes.
Following Garicano (2000) , I use a stochastic method to formulate the above problemsolving process. I de…ne a random variable Z to represent the problems that a producer will potentially encounter during production. Let R + be the set of all possible problems and A be the set of problems that the producer is able to solve, referred to as the knowledge set. The distribution of problems associated with a particular task is represented by a continuous and di¤erentiable probability distribution F (Z) with a density function f (Z) over . Output is produced when a problem randomly drawn from the distribution F (Z)
lies within a worker's knowledge set A.
The density function f (Z) measures the frequency of problems. I normalize f (Z) to be non-increasing so that problems are ordered from most to least common. Such normalization captures the idea that when performing tasks, workers identify and attempt more-common problems before less-common ones. With this normalization, I can compare two knowledge
The problems encompassed in set A 2 are less common than those in A 1 . I thus call the knowledge in A 2 more advanced than that in A 1 . Moreover, the density function f (Z) provides a convenient characterization of a task. For instance, routine tasks can be characterized by a density distribution with high frequency of common problems (i.e., a small value of Z), whereas innovative tasks are associated with a high frequency of uncommon problems (i.e., a large value of Z). For expositional simplicity, I use the term "complexity" to describe a task that is characterized by the distribution of common and uncommon problems encompassed in it. For instance, a task is more complex if F (Z) has a thicker tail, implying a higher probability of encountering uncommon problems. Conceptually, our notion of complexity is consistent with the one that is used in the studies of complex system (e.g., Simon 1962; Kau¤man 1993). 6 Provided that the knowledge used in production is speci…c to the problems to be solved, a worker must expend e¤ort and time to acquire the knowledge needed to identify problems, search for solutions, and eventually match solutions to problems. This process of knowledge acquisition, even in the form of reproducing existing knowledge, is costly. For simplicity, I assume that the cost of acquiring a knowledge set A (learning all the problems in A)
is proportional to its size (A), i.e., the Lebesgue measure of the set A. 
Holding the probability of solving problems the same, the cost of acquiring moreadvanced knowledge that is used to solve less-common problems is e¤ectively higher. Thus, it is unnecessary to assume that the unit cost of knowledge acquisition increases with the complexity of problems. 7 In sum, facing a task with a distribution of problems, F (Z), a single worker acquires knowledge A w = [0; Z w ] to maximize the expected net output y:
Note that in this single worker production problem, a worker acquires a knowledge interval starting from zero, which indicates the most common problems because of the assumption of the non-increasing density function for the random variable Z.
Organization
Similar to the example in Section 2, a …rm can employ a team to improve the e¢ ciency of production. Di¤erently, I now allow for an arbitrary formation of a team, and a hierarchy will emerge as an equilibrium outcome. As in Garicano ( Then, F (z i ) is the probability of the problem being solved by an agent in class i, and cz i measures the cost that this agent expends to acquire the knowledge. An agent in class i
can refer an unsolved problem to an agent in class i + 1. The probability that a problem is solved when it is passed through workers from the bottom
As described in Section 2, referring a problem to another worker, regardless of whether the problem is solved, incurs a communication cost, h < 1; in terms of the receiver's time. With this speci…cation, the …rm maximizes its expected output by allocating the size of knowledge intervals, z i , to members at each layer, the fraction of 7 The current modeling framework is equivalent to modeling a constant marginal bene…t of solving problems with increasing marginal costs of acquiring more-advanced knowledge. members, i , at each layer, and the number of layers, L, of the hierarchy, as follows:
and
The term [1 F ( (5) measures the number of unsolved problems that pass through layers from 0 to i 1 and must be dealt with by agents at layer i. Thus, the constraint simply means that the time that an agent in class i spends helping agents in class i 1 when they refer unsolved problems cannot exceed her available time, which is normalized to one. Constraint (6) is merely an identity to guarantee that all the fractions of agents add up to one.
Product
I now introduce the key strategic variable -product choice -on top of the above production and organization problems. A …rm can choose a product, indexed with a scalar k, from a continuum of product position. As in Section 2, the index k indicates two sides of a product.
On the supply side, it indicates the complexity of tasks in the production process. A larger k implies greater complexity of tasks and a larger probability of encountering uncommon problems. On the demand side, k indicates the market position of a product. A larger k implies a higher product position, at which consumers are willingness to pay a higher price.
This speci…cation of k is analogous to a model of vertical product di¤erentiation in the industrial organization literature. In the rest of the paper, I call a product indexed with a greater k "a product at a higher position," or simply, "a superior product."
The positive relationship between a product's market value and the complexity of production tasks is prominent in the professional service industries. For example, Maister (1993) classi…es professional services into three types: 1) the "Commodity" type, which only requires solving routine and standardized problems; 2) the "Process" type, which requires solving a wide range of normal problems with occasional occurrences of exceptional ones; and 3) the "Customization" type, which requires solving complex problems with frequent encounters of exceptional ones. "Commodity" services, including taxation and …nancial services for individual customers and basic software diagnosis and engineering tests, have low market value. "Process" services, including corporate accounting and legal services and the design of modestly-scaled information or engineering systems, have intermediate market value. "Customization" services, including strategic management consulting, legal services for corporate …nancial transactions, and the design of innovative information or engineering systems, have high market value.
As in Section 2, I denote the price of a unit of product k as (k), with 0 (k) > 0. A …rm's pro…t-maximization problem is:
s.t. (5) and (6) .
Compared to (4), the objective function (7) accommodates the parameter k in three places. First, (k) is the market price of product k. Second, as a measure of task complexity, k directly a¤ects the functional form of the knowledge distribution. Third, mostly for technical purposes, I add the term g(k) with g 0 (k) > 0. Economically, g(k) can represent two costs:
the entry cost and the cost of capturing customers. g(k) increases with k, as it would be more costly to enter a high-end market segment and to maintain the customer relationship for a superior product. Note that I take the price function (k) as given, as this paper focuses on a …rm's decisions about the alignment between product selection and internal structure.
One can endogenize this pricing function in a market equilibrium model, as will be discussed later in Section 5.4.
Assumptions
From the single-worker production problem (3) to the organizational problem (4) to the strategy problem (7), a …rm must make three sets of decisions regarding 1) the levels of knowledge to acquire for all workers and the distribution of knowledge among them; 2) the organizational structure that speci…es the height (the number of layers) and width (the span of control) of the hierarchy; and 3) the product position that determines the market value and the complexity of problems that occur during the production process. These decisions are inter-dependent, and solving the entire optimization problem is non-trivial. To simplify matters, I make two additional assumptions.
Assumption 1
The complexity of tasks is characterized by an exponential distribution of problems encountered in production:
x with x 0 and k 0.
The qualitative results of this paper hold for a general class of probability distributions with non-decreasing density. The exponential distribution brings about substantial technical convenience because of its memoryless property. Moreover, it has a natural economic interpretation of complexity. The single parameter 1 k , which governs the shape of the distribution, determines the frequency of encountering uncommon problems, the average di¢ culty (the mean of the distribution), and the predictability (the variance). Thus, a larger k indicates a more-complex task in the sense that uncommon problems are encountered more often, and that problems are on average more di¢ cult to solve and are less predictable. Maister's clas- This technical assumption is imposed to rule out the extreme situation in which the marginal value of a higher product position increases so quickly that a …rm will always choose a corner solution. In the rest of this paper, Assumptions 1 and 2 are taken as given unless otherwise speci…ed.
Solutions
I break down the pro…t-maximization problem (7) into two stages. First, taking product position k as given, the …rm optimally chooses its organizational structure and acquires knowledge for all of its employees. This can be thought of as a short-run scenario in which a structure is designed to follow a selected product strategy. Second, the …rm chooses its product position. This re ‡ects a long-run scenario in which a …rm can adjust both its product strategy and its organizational structure.
Organizational Structure
For a given k, I divide all terms on both sides of (7) by (k) to obtain a normalized objective function:
This objective function, together with the constraints (5) and (6), is a variant of (4). I apply the method in Garicano (2000) to solve such an optimization problem. First, with the normalization that more-common problems encountered …rst (recall that the density distribution of problems is non-increasing) and the assumption that the cost of acquiring knowledge is proportional to the size of the knowledge, it is optimal for an agent in class i > 0 to completely specializes in helping agents in class i 1. 8 Therefore, the constraint in (5) is always binding. Then, I can use the recursive structure of this binding constraint to eliminate i from the objective function (8) . From P L i=0 i = 1, I can also eliminate 0 and write (8) as a function exclusively of the knowledge acquired by agents at each layer. Absent integer constraints, the optimum number of layers (L) is unlimited, because the exponential distribution of F (:) has the memoryless property. To keep the model tractable, I do not impose an integer constraint on the number of layers. 9 Implicitly, the employment size of the organization is measured in terms of labor that is in…nitely divisible, instead of in terms of people, so it is reasonable not to impose integer constraints.
Intuitively, after a piece of knowledge has been acquired with a …xed cost, the …rm wishes to use this knowledge as many times as possible. To minimize the cost of knowledge acquisition, division of labor is needed: each agent acquires a di¤erent set of knowledge 10 ; to intensify the use of knowledge, the agents whose knowledge is more costly to acquire specialize in helping other agents with their unsolved problems. Thus, a hierarchical structure based on agents'specialization in knowledge is used to trade-o¤ the intensive use of knowledge against the cost of acquiring knowledge. Analytically, the agents at the bottom (i = 0) specialize in production without helping any others, while agents at all the upper layers specialize in helping subordinates solve problems. Because of this pattern of vertical specialization, I will refer to agents at the bottom layer as workers and agents above the bottom layer as managers, among whom I distinguish between senior and junior managers when necessary. In the context of PSFs, workers are associates who directly handle customers' problems, and managers are principals or partners who focus on problems that are referred by associates.
With an exponential F (:), all managers, regardless of which layer, acquire the same size of knowledge at optimum, i.e., for i > 0, Z i Z i 1 = Z i+1 Z i or z i = z i+1 . This gives a closed-form solution to the optimal size of knowledge intervals acquired by workers and managers, respectively,
The span of control, de…ned by the ratio of agents across two adjacent layers, is constant:
The intuitions of the above solutions can be illustrated by the two …gures below: Figure   2a illustrates the optimal acquisition of knowledge for each agent, and Figure 2b illustrates the optimal hierarchical structure. In Figure 2a knowledge of the senior manager (at the second layer) can be used s 2 times, which is a convex function with respect to s.
Several features with regard to solutions (9), (10), and (11) are worth noting. First, the solution in (10) can be written as z m = z w k ln h, implying that the manager's knowledge increases with the worker's knowledge. This is because a more-able worker can release his manager's time to help other workers, resulting in an increase in the returns to the manager's knowledge. Second, given k and h, the span of control s pins down the knowledge distribution across layers in the hierarchy. 12 A larger span of control encourages a manager to acquire more-advanced knowledge because her knowledge can be used more intensively. It also encourages a worker to further acquire knowledge because of the endogenous complementarity between managers'knowledge and workers'knowledge. Third, an organization's production e¢ ciency can be fully characterized by the span of control. Thus, despite that the optimal number of layers in this model is unlimited, I can regard the hierarchy as consisting of two layers: a layer of workers and a layer of managers.
Product Choice
I now turn to the decision of product choice. Substituting the optimal solutions (9)- (11) into (7), the optimal output can be written as:
The …rm's objective function boils down to:
The …rst term in (12) is the market value of product k, the second term is the entry cost of attaining and capturing such a product position, and the last term indicates the cost of acquiring knowledge for all agents to solve the problems associated with product k.
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1-2, there always exists a unique interior solution k to the …rm's pro…t-optimization problem (12) .
Proof. See the appendix. With Lemma 1, the optimal product choice is determined by the following …rst order condition:
This condition re ‡ects that a …rm optimally chooses its product position to balance costs and bene…ts. The left-hand side captures two incremental costs that arise when a …rm moves its product towards a higher position. First, the term g 0 (k ) indicates that the …rm must pay a larger entry cost. Second, producing a superior product requires solving more complex problems. If the agents'knowledge levels remain unchanged, the probability of successfully solving problems would decrease. Thus, to maintain the same probability of success, a …rm facing more-complex problems must pay an additional learning cost for the entire team. The second term captures this cost.
On the right-hand side of (13), the …rst term is the incremental market value of a product at a higher position. The second term captures the indirect e¤ect of adjusting the product position on a …rm's organizational structure. For instance, when (k) is a convex function
ck ln h+ (k ) < 0. This negative term induces the …rm to choose a product at a higher position. Intuitively, the convexity of the price function entails a greater marginal value of moving towards a higher position; thus, a …rm has a strong incentive to acquire more knowledge for its agents, which in turn allows the …rm to enlarge its span of control. This organizational adjustment reinforces the choice of a higher market position.
Conversely, when (k) is a concave function (i.e., (k) > k 0 (k)), the marginal value of moving towards a higher position decreases. If the …rm chooses a higher product position, the bene…t is not enough to justify the cost of acquiring additional knowledge to cope with more-complex problems. Employees then become less competent and will refer unsolved problems more frequently; the extent of knowledge leverage decreases. Anticipating such a consequence, the …rm may prefer a product at a lower position to avoid the costs of acquiring and integrating knowledge.
The above analysis has important implications for the strategic …t between a …rm's product positioning k and span of control s. The position of product indicates how much unit value a …rm can create by solving customers' problems. The span of control indicates how e¢ ciently a …rm can extract economies of scale in the utilization of knowledge. The former choice emphasizes value creation, and the latter choice emphasizes production e¢ ciency. The optimal …t between the two choices precisely re ‡ects how a pro…t-maximizing …rm resolves the con ‡ict between value creation and production e¢ ciency. Figure 3 illustrates this basic idea. In the (s; k) space, the PP curve depicts the iso-pro…t function such that a …rm can attain the same level of pro…tability through di¤erent combinations of (s; k). It slopes downward because increasing one variable while holding the other constant would generate more pro…t, as seen from (12). The CC curve depicts the cost function due to the communication constraint faced by a manager who specializes in helping workers with unsolved problems.
It slopes upward because workers producing a superior product face more-complex problems and ask for help more frequently; thus, the span of control is reduced. 13 The tangent point between the two curves -the pair (s ; k ) -pins down the optimal …t between a …rm's product position and span of control. Ideally, a …rm wants to simultaneously choose a superior product and a large span of control, as the …rm can thus create greater value and appropriate this value by improving the e¢ ciency of production. I refer to such a combination of product choice and organizational structure as strategic complements (the solid arrow line in Figure 3 ). However, to deploy such a strategy, a …rm must be capable to acquire substantial knowledge for its employees, maintain a balanced distribution of knowledge across hierarchical layers, and e¤ectively communicate knowledge across layers. If a …rm lacks these capabilities, it must compromise between value creation and production e¢ ciency. When a …rm pairs a high-end product with a narrow span of control or pairs a low-end product with a wide span of control (the dotted arrow lines in Figure 3 ), I refer to either of these combinations as strategic substitutes.
Applications: Building Knowledge-based Capabilities
In the above model, a …rm optimally chooses its product position and hierarchical structure in response to two parameters: c, the e¢ ciency of learning knowledge, and h, the e¢ ciency of communicating knowledge. These two parameters re ‡ect a …rm's intangible ability to acquire and integrate knowledge a core ability in the development of a …rm's competitive advantage, as argued by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) and Grant (1996a) , among many others. In this section, I articulate the e¤ects of changes in the two parameters on the alignment between product choice and organizational structure. To facilitate the analysis, I make the following assumption to replace Assumption 2.
Assumption 3 a)
The price of a product with position k is: (k) = k t, with > 0 and t > 0; b) The cost function g(k) is su¢ ciently convex: g 00 (k) > 0 and is su¢ ciently large relative to .
Part a) of this assumption speci…es a linear pricing rule. The two parameters and t capture the market condition under which a …rm creates value by o¤ering a unit of product to its customers. Speci…cally, measures the marginal market value of increasing product position, and t is an industry-wide transfer from …rms to consumers. Because of linear pricing, the assumption on the cost function in part b), as a special case of Assumption 2, is necessary to guarantee the existence of an interior solution. Assumption 3 also allows us to gauge other pricing forms with the linear pricing rule.
Learning Ability and Knowledge Acquisition
I take a problem-solving approach in which an individual worker acquires knowledge to solve problems. Knowledge is learned to overcome the cognitive limitation in problem-solving, and the cost of knowledge acquisition is primarily the time that a problem solver expends to identify customers'demand and match solutions to problems. A …rm can obtain better learning ability through two channels. First, at the individual level, "all the learning occurs in the human mind" (Simon 1991) . A …rm can improve individual workers' e¢ ciency to acquire knowledge by superior hiring processes that allow for the selection of more competent employees, better training and mentoring of employees, and the adoption of new technology and methods that enhance workers'ability to extract information, identify problems, reproduce knowledge, and learn new solutions. Second, at the organizational level, a …rm can structure organizational routines to facilitate the matching of solutions to problems and develop organizational culture to motivate employees to acquire knowledge. This second aspect is particularly important when knowledge required to solve problems is tacit and di¢ cult to measure, as it is a source of non-imitable organizational capability (e.g., Kogut and Zander 1992) . In this paper, I regard all sorts of improvements in a …rm's learning ability as a reduction of parameter c in the model.
In the model, for a given product position, an improvement in a …rm's learning ability encourages both managers and workers to acquire more knowledge, which generates a higher probability of successfully solving problems. Moreover, with more knowledge, lower-layer agents (workers) ask for help from upper-layer agents (managers) less frequently. Thus, a manager can use her knowledge more intensively by helping more subordinate workers; this improved knowledge leveraging induces the manager to acquire further knowledge. Having acquired more knowledge, the …rm may consider choosing a superior product. Such a new product choice will generate two opposing e¤ects on the …rm's incentive to acquire knowledge.
On the one hand, the increased unit value of the new product encourages knowledge acquisition; on the other hand, the increased complexity of problems encountered in production discourages knowledge acquisition. This trade-o¤ determines the optimal level of knowledge acquisition and the distribution of knowledge across hierarchical layers, which in turn determine the …rm's product choice in conjunction with its hierarchical structure. In the following proposition, I demonstrate a case in which greater learning ability enables a …rm to exploit strategic complementarity between product positioning and hierarchical structure.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 3, an improvement in learning ability (i.e., a decrease in c) induces a …rm to enlarge its span of control and choose a product at a higher position, associated with more knowledge acquired for both managers and workers.
Proof. See the appendix. Proposition 1 shows that the ability to acquire knowledge is crucial for a …rm to sustain a high-end market position. Moving to a higher product position without the ability to acquire more knowledge not only decreases the quality of the product, as measured by the probability of solving problems, but also reduces the intensity of using existent knowledge. This provides an explanation for the fact that high-end law, consulting, and …nancial service …rms expend great e¤orts to hire experts with in-depth industrial knowledge, to develop research-related manpower or knowledge centers, and to cooperate with universities.
The linear pricing rule in Assumption 3 is an important, though not necessary, condition for achieving complementarities among a …rm's knowledge acquisition, product positioning, and span of control. During the o¤ering of a higher-end product, workers encounter more uncommon problems, and the probability of solving these problems is reduced. A …rm's incentive to acquire knowledge would decrease if the market value of moving to a higher position is not great enough. Linear pricing ensures that the marginal value of a product does not decline with its market position. This o¤sets the …rm's reduced incentive to acquire knowledge because of the need to handle more-complex problems. In the real business world, I certainly do not expect the linear pricing rule to apply to every circumstance. For example, when a superior product does not proportionally increase consumers' willingness to pay, a …rm's pricing rule may be a concave function with respect to its product position. In such a case, an improvement in a …rm's learning ability may induce it to choose a lower product position, because it may be more valuable for the …rm to focus on production e¢ ciency by expanding the span of control, forgoing the high unit value.
Communication Ability and Knowledge Integration
In the …eld of epistemology, one key property that distinguishes di¤erent types of knowledge is codi…ability (e.g., Polanyi 1966 Polanyi , 1974 . Knowledge is more codi…able when it is easier to express, store, divide, and transfer. The distinction of knowledge based on its codi…ability is an important element in the knowledge-based theory of organizational capabilities (e.g., because that knowledge will be used more intensively. With more-able managers, a …rm then has an incentive to choose a superior product. The result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 3, an improvement in the ability to communicate knowledge (i.e., a decrease in h) induces a …rm to enlarge its span of control and choose a product at a higher position, associated with more knowledge acquired for managers.
Proof. See the appendix. Apparently, the e¤ect of an improvement in communication ability on a …rm's product position and span of control is similar to the e¤ect of an improvement in learning ability. However, the mechanisms underlying these e¤ects are di¤erent. Improved communication directly a¤ects a manager's span of control, which then improves agents'incentive to acquire knowledge, whereas improved learning ability directly increases the level of knowledge acquired by agents, which in turn allows a manager to maintain a larger span of control. Because "Gray Hair" (intermediate h); and 3) "Rocket Science" (high h). In the "Procedure" business, knowledge input in production is primarily data based and highly codi…able. The cost of communicating this type of knowledge is low. It is more e¢ cient to use a ‡at organizational structure with a manager supervising a large number of quali…ed associates. Substantial investments in human capital are unnecessary. This is the situation in engineering service and accounting …rms, which have a large associate-to-manager ratio and employees who tend to be newly minted college graduates. In the "Gray Hair" business, knowledge input is largely based on experience but often is reusable. The cost of communication is higher than in the "Procedure" business. To sustain high-quality services, a …rm involved in the "Gray Hair"
business requires a smaller associate-to-manager ratio. Organizational capabilities hinge on the complementarity between managers and associates. Therefore, investments in human capital are important. Finally, in the "Rocket Science" business, knowledge input is often based on experimentation and highly innovative. Because this type of knowledge is highly costly to codify and communicate, it is di¢ cult to leverage the talent of stellar managers.
This partially explains why business-strategy consulting …rms and Wall Street law …rms have a much lower associate-to-partner ratio than do other PSFs.
Advances in Information and Communication Technology
Numerous studies have shown that the advances in information and communication technology (ICT) have had a profound impact on …rms'workplace organization and managerial practices. 14 The literature stresses that ICT enters the production function as a substitute for unskilled labor but a complement for skilled labor, which induces changes in organizational structure that permit more e¢ cient management of skilled labor (e.g., Brynjolfsson One major consequence of adopting these technologies is that knowledge becomes much easier to extract, code (digitize), store, cross-reference, and transfer. Corresponding to the theoretical model, the improvement of ICT allows …rms to reduce both the costs of acquiring and communicating knowledge. Propositions 1 and 2 immediately lead to the following result. 
Extensions
The results in Section 4 are pertinent to some of the model's speci…c assumptions. Nevertheless, the insight of the model is more general than these results. In this section, I discuss several extensions of the model to address more-sophisticated managerial issues.
Task Complexity and Codi…ability of Knowledge
In The extension in this subsection has important implications for the management of PSFs whose services simultaneously fall into two classi…cations that I have discussed: one based on the complexity of tasks and the other based on the codi…ability of knowledge. For PSFs involving "Commodity" tasks and "Procedure" knowledge (small k and small h), solving customers'problems does not require advanced knowledge, and managers'knowledge can be easily leveraged. Thus, it is optimal for PSFs of this kind to match a low-end product position to a large span of control without substantial investments in workers' human capital. For
PSFs involving "Process" tasks and "Gray Hair" knowledge (medium k and medium h), the prices of their services are modest, and …rms'pro…ts come from high quality and repetitive services. A knowledge-based hierarchy with high-quality employees and a sizeable span of control to e¤ectively leverage top managers' knowledge is crucial to achieve e¢ ciency. For
PSFs involving "Customization" tasks and "Rocket Science" knowledge (large k and large h), solving customers'problems requires exceptional knowledge. Although the high prices of these services provide incentives for …rms to acquire substantial knowledge, the considerable communication cost limits the extent of leveraging knowledge. Thus, the span of control is narrow, and business success heavily relies on a few superstars who have acquired remarkable knowledge.
Given the correlation between task complexity and knowledge codi…ability, the advances in ICT are likely to have di¤erent impacts on the organizational structure of PSFs in di¤erent segments. Numerous evidence suggests that the impact of ICT on knowledge transfer and information communication is most e¤ective when knowledge is codi…able. In contrast, when knowledge is tacit, the e¤ect of ICT on knowledge transfer within organizations is limited.
Therefore, the advances in ICT are likely to substantially enlarge the span of control of PSFs in the low-end segment, which perform "Commodity" tasks, but barely a¤ect the span of control of PSFs in the high-end segment, which perform "Customization" tasks. This di¤erentiated e¤ect can amplify the di¤erence in the hierarchical structure of PSFs across market segments.
Endogenous Communication Ability
In this paper, I treat a …rm's communication ability as a parameter that is subject to exoge- Endogenous communication ability is particularly important when knowledge used to solve problems is tacit, for instance, the knowledge used in strategic business consulting and legal services for sophisticated …nancial transactions. In these situations, e¤ective communication of knowledge within organizations requires a "people-to-people" approach, instead of a "people-to-documents" approach. How people interact with each other to create and communicate knowledge is largely an institutional problem and is endogenous to a …rm's
culture. An extension to endogenize a …rm's e¢ ciency in communicating tacit knowledge is naturally connected to the study of organizational culture, either treated by economists as the general principle and the means for coordination (Kreps 1990 ) and a common language of coding (Cremer 1993) , or regarded by strategy scholars as an element of routines (Nelson and
Unbalanced Knowledge Distribution
In the model, I implicitly regard a …rm's learning ability as a unidimensional capability that applies equally to workers at all layers. Thus, improved learning ability induces all agents to acquire further knowledge in a balanced manner so that a …rm can choose a high-end product without reducing its span of control. The general insight is that a balanced distribution of knowledge across hierarchical layers is crucial for a …rm to exploit the complementarity between its product position and span of control. Without being protected by competent subordinates, even the most-talented managers, who can solve the most complex and valuable problems, may be outperformed by less-talented managers supported by competent subordinates.
In reality, not all …rms can achieve a balanced distribution of knowledge across hierarchical layers because more-advanced knowledge is likely more costly to acquire. I can adapt the current model, in which individual workers acquire knowledge internally and …rms bear the ability to solve customers' problems, but also to facilitate the leveraging of top managers' talent.
Heterogeneous Firm Performance
Using detailed within-…rm data from speci…c industries, a number of recent empirical stud- Provided that the product choice element in our model explicitly relates a …rm's internal organization to the product market condition, another potential extension of the model is to study …rms' strategy and performance over the product life cycle. The basic idea is sketched as follows. At the introduction stage, …rms enter the market with innovative products; competition is weak and the products'prices are high. Firms have great incentives to acquire further knowledge so as to enhance the market value of their products. However, at this nascent stage, the knowledge required for production is often new and di¢ cult to communicate among individuals; thus, it is di¢ cult to leverage the knowledge possessed by a limited number of individuals within the …rm. According to the model, the optimal strategy for a …rm at the introduction stage is to focus on the creation of high-value products and the acquisition of new knowledge, forgoing the intensive use of existing knowledge. At the development stage during which the products become more mature, competition increases, and the marginal value of product upgrades begins to decrease. Simultaneously, the knowledge required for production becomes more familiar to workers and easier to codify. A …rm's optimal strategy at this stage is to exploit the complementarity between value creation and knowledge leverage. Finally, at the mature stage when products become standardized and imitable, competition is …erce and the pro…t margin is low. It is optimal for a …rm to focus on improving the codi…ability and integration of knowledge, forgoing value creation through product innovation. Such an extension o¤ers an explanation for the transformation of strategy and organizational structure from "exploration" to "exploitation" over the product life cycle, as documented in previous studies (e.g., Hofer 1975; Anderson and Zeithaml 1984).
Conclusion
The …t of important elements of organization and of the organization as a whole with its strategy and environment is a central topic in strategy research. In this paper, I formulate a particular aspect of the …t between strategy and structure -the …t between the choice of vertically di¤erentiated products and the structure of vertically integrated hierarchies. This speci…c focus captures the essential features of knowledge-based production and delivers farreaching implications for the strategic management of knowledge-intensive …rms, particularly
PSFs. The major managerial implications that I have discussed are collected in Table 1 .
These implications are applicable to the management of other economic activities in which knowledge and expertise are major inputs, for instance, R&D, product design, and creative businesses.
Despite our focus on knowledge-intensive …rms, the economic principles underlying the model are highly relevant to many other settings. First, organizational structure plays an important strategic role in mediating between available resources and product choice. The premise is that producing more-valuable products requires the acquisition and use of more expensive resources -in our model, superior knowledge. When an organizational structure is designed to facilitate the utilization of those resources, a …rm increases its incentive to acquire more-expensive resources and to choose more-valuable products. This principle is relevant to settings in which production is innovation-oriented and the resources critical to production are di¢ cult to acquire. Second, to achieve superior performance, a …rm should not only align its organizational structure with its product strategy, but also actively explore the complementarity between product choice and organizational structure. From a dynamic perspective, this complementarity is an important driver for continuous product innovations and …rm growth. I stress the importance of building the knowledge-based capabilities -the ability to acquire and integrate knowledge, precisely because these capabilities are crucial for exploiting the complementarity between product choice and organizational structure. Third, the model establishes a theory of strategy and structure that is neither "structure follows strategy," as in Chandler's (1962) dictum, nor is it "strategy follows structure" (e.g., Bower 1970; Burgelman 1983). Instead, strategy and structure are jointly determined in equilibrium in response to environmental changes. This view of "strategic …t" is particularly important for …rms'long-term strategic choices, as stressed by Roberts and Saloner (2013) .
Modeling a …t of some elements of strategy and organization entails the simpli…cation and 
For notational simplicity, let x = ck ln h: Then,
Given that z s = k ln( When g 00 (k) 00 (k) is su¢ ciently large, the …rst term in the numerator of the (14) dominates the second term. Then, Note that c must be positive to satisfy the above …rst order condition. Then, Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. Without invoking Assumption 3, the …rst order condition of the optimization problem (12) is
Then, 
